![]() Therefore, Ilina and Rados stand for the proposition that lay witnesses may opine on “unordinary” matters if they have acquired, through their professional activates, the requisite experiential capacity to do so. Furthermore, Pinkerton’s testimony, as from someone employed in the area related to the erection of signs on Toronto streets in relation to traffic safety and the control of traffic and pedestrian movement on those streets gives Pinkerton the necessary and relevant experience and background to testify on why a certain category of sign is specifically located at a certain location. In other words, he has the “experiential capacity” of an ordinary person to give factual and opinion evidence on the procedure and erection of signs on highways in the City of Toronto, and to even offer up an opinion as to the purpose and function of a particular sign erected by the City of Toronto. “experience, background and knowledge obtained from working and dealing with signs related to traffic and safety issues provides him relevant knowledge of categories of traffic signs and the general purpose behind the erection of particular traffic signs on Toronto streets. In allowing the opinion evidence, among other factors, the court stated that There, the court held that the manager of the department responsible for the installation of traffic signs and placement of pavement markings in Toronto was able to give opinion evidence concerning the use of road signs and how those signs are chosen at a particular location. There, the court stated that the capacity of the officers to form that opinion “was part and parcel of their professional experience to assess the crime scene.” In Ontario, a similar line of reasoning was established in R. Ilina allowed two lay witness police officers to opine that a crime scene had been cleaned. For instance, the Manitoba Court of Appeal decision in R. Nevertheless, there is some jurisprudence that suggests lay witnesses may opine on evidence not derived from ordinary experience where special circumstances exist. A lay person may therefore offer opinion evidence as to the speed of a car, but only an expert can offer opinion evidence as to the speed of an airplane. For example, persons of ordinary experience may be able to estimate the speed of a car, but not the speed of an airplane. ![]() If so, then the expert opinion rule should be used. The second prong asks whether the opinion evidence offered by the inspector requires special knowledge going beyond that of ordinary persons. (2) Is the inspector’s conclusion one that persons of ordinary experience are able to make? These witnesses were therefore in a better position than the trier of fact to determine the degree of impairment and could give the court real help.Therefore, where contemporaneous observation benefits the account of a set of facts, the first element in the above-noted test is probably satisfied. For example, in Graat, where non-expert opinion evidence was admitted, the witnesses had an opportunity for contemporaneous, personal observation, and the opinion was based on perceived facts as to the manner of driving and the indicia of intoxication of the driver. The first prong turns on the added benefit of first-hand observation. (1) Is the inspector in a better position than the trier-of-fact to form the conclusion? Nevertheless, once satisfied by the evidence in a voir dire that the opinion evidence is admissible, the ultimate weight to be given to the opinion will be up to the trier of fact (i.e.
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